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Abstract
The hippocampus plays a central role in the approach–avoidance conﬂict that is central to the genesis of anxiety. However,
its exact functional contribution has yet to be identiﬁed. We designed a novel gambling task that generated approach–
avoidance conﬂict while controlling for spatial processing. We ﬁt subjects’ behavior using a model that quantiﬁed the
subjective values of choice options, and recorded neural signals using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
Distinct functional signals were observed in anterior hippocampus, with inferior hippocampus selectively recruited when
subjects rejected a gamble, to a degree that covaried with individual differences in anxiety. The superior anterior
hippocampus, in contrast, uniquely demonstrated value signals that were potentiated in the context of approach–avoidance
conﬂict. These results implicate the anterior hippocampus in behavioral avoidance and choice monitoring, in a manner
relevant to understanding its role in anxiety. Our ﬁndings highlight interactions between subregions of the hippocampus as
an important focus for future study.
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Introduction
Approach–avoidance conﬂict arises when animals encounter
probabilistic gains and losses within the same experience and
are thus forced to balance the desire to seek reward with the
impulse to avoid harm. Such conﬂict between approach and
avoidance is thought to be central to the generation of anxiety,
a state of high arousal and negative valence that is experienced
in the absence of an immediate threat (Russell 1980; Davis and
Shi 1999; Gray and McNaughton 2000; Calhoon and Tye 2015).
Behavior in approach–avoidance situations as commonly used
in rodent anxiety assays is highly sensitive to both anxiolytic
drugs (Borsini et al. 2002) and hippocampal lesions (particularly
to the anterior hippocampus, corresponding to the ventral
hippocampus in rodents; Bannerman et al. 2003; Pentkowski
et al. 2006; see Gray and McNaughton 2000 for review). More
recently, evidence has emerged implicating the hippocampus
in anxiety and approach–avoidance processing in humans as
well (Bach et al. 2014; O’Neil et al. 2015).
Theoretical work suggests different ways in which the hippo-
campus may contribute to the processes underlying anxiety
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(Gray and McNaughton 2000). First, the hippocampus may moni-
tor for conﬂict between impulses to approach and avoid. Second,
it may inhibit ongoing behavior once conﬂict is detected. Third, it
may initiate information seeking or risk-assessment activities to
gather more information about alternative courses of action. To
date, experimental attempts to disentangle these distinct contri-
butions have been lacking. Hippocampal damage has been
demonstrated to result in impulsivity and deﬁcits in behavioral
inhibition in the context of an approach–avoidance conﬂict
(Abela et al. 2013; Bach et al. 2014). Evidence for a role of this
structure in information seeking more generally (i.e., outside
approach–avoidance situations) is mixed (Daw et al. 2006; Simon
and Daw 2011; Badre et al. 2012; Bornstein and Daw 2012, 2013;
Wang and Voss 2014). Results do suggest that the hippocampus
is involved in forward planning in humans and vicarious trial-
and-error behavior in rodents (which emerges when animals are
unsure about which choice to make during learning; see Johnson
et al. 2007 and Redish 2016 for review). However, although for-
ward planning and information seeking may, to some extent,
depend on shared neuronal mechanisms, it is unclear whether
such hippocampal-dependent processes are more likely to be
engaged speciﬁcally in the context of approach–avoidance con-
ﬂict (as suggested by Gray et al.).
An additional unresolved issue relates to whether the
hippocampus is speciﬁcally involved in approach–avoidance
conﬂict, or whether instead it merely represents the episodic
context within which such conﬂict occurs. This latter possibil-
ity is theoretically important given the role of the hippocampus
in representing spatiotemporal contexts (e.g., as noted in Rudy
et al. 2002; see Burgess et al. 2002 for review). Although links
between anxiety and hippocampal anatomy have been noted
in humans (Barrós-Loscertales et al. 2006; Levita et al. 2014),
most functional studies of approach–avoidance conﬂict have
hitherto employed experimental paradigms with signiﬁcant
spatiotemporal components (e.g., Bach et al. 2014, Hasler et al.,
2007; though note a recent exception in O’Neil et al. 2015). As
such, the extent to which the hippocampus’ contribution
relates mostly to representing the spatiotemporal context in
approach–avoidance situations remains unclear.
To address these issues, we employed functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) alongside a novel approach–avoidance
(Ap/Av) gambling task that enabled us to separate hippocampal
contributions to avoidance and exploration. We controlled for
nonspeciﬁc processes unrelated to aversion (e.g., memory, plan-
ning, spatial processing) by including an approach–approach (Ap/
Ap) condition in which subjects faced the same probabilistic gam-
bles without the threat of loss, and instead had to make choices
according to what they thought was most likely to be rewarded.
By allowing subjects to choose explicitly between rejecting aver-
sive gambles and exploring them (i.e., risk assessment, request-
ing more information), we tested whether the hippocampal
contributions to choice in an approach–avoidance context related
to behavioral avoidance or to information gathering (exploration).
A ﬁrst model-agnostic analysis of choice-related signals revealed
a segregation of signals within the anterior hippocampus: the
inferior hippocampus (potentially overlapping with the CA1 sub-
ﬁeld) distinguished between avoiding an instrumentally aversive
gamble and acknowledging an abstract threat that posed no
instrumental harm, whereas the superior hippocampus (poten-
tially overlapping with the CA3 subﬁeld) did not show this dis-
tinction. Next, we employed a model-based approach focusing on
value signals that may have been calculated by subjects doing
our task, and showed that superior hippocampal value signals
are uniquely potentiated in the context of approach–avoidance
conﬂict, consistent with a role in monitoring ongoing experiences
for conditions that necessitate an avoidant response.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Thirty-nine adults completed training sessions on the task, of
whom 21 were selected for imaging (see Experimental Procedure
for detail). Of these 21 subjects, 1 was excluded for poor MRI
coverage. Thus, a total of 20 subjects completed all sessions of
the experiment and were included in the analyses (9 male; mean
age = 22.60 years, standard deviation [SD] = 2.39). All subjects
were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and none reported a history of neurological/psychiatric condi-
tions. All subjects gave written informed consent, according to
the local ethics clearance committee (No. 3793/001, University
College London, UK). Anxiety scores were collected (State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory [STAI]; Spielberger and Gorsuch 1970), and cor-
related with other data using Spearman’s rank correlation test
(nonparametric test used because the anxiety scores were not
normally distributed; Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, D(20) = 0.22, P <
0.01). Note that although the use of STAI is thought to index indi-
vidual differences in anxiety, this metric is not able to completely
separate anxiety from depressive traits, given the high level of
correlation between these traits in the general population
(Kaneda and Fujii 2000; Bados et al. 2010; Hill et al. 2013).
Experimental Task
Our task manipulated the extent to which approach and avoid-
ance impulses were pitted against each other, while controlling
for other nonspeciﬁc psychological factors (i.e., similarly to exist-
ing paradigms like the Columbia Card Task, which does not how-
ever allow subjects the option to collect more information before
proceeding; Figner et al. 2009). Subjects experienced 2 conditions
(approach–avoidance, Ap/Av and approach–approach, Ap/Ap)
with the same design, but different semantics and consequences
for the actions (see Fig. 1A). On each trial, subjects saw a certain
number of tokens (ﬁlled circles) on a colored background indicat-
ing potential rewards. Hidden among all the possible locations
might be a bomb; but it would only be “activated” if it was planted
under one of the tokens in the array. The different colored back-
grounds indicated different probabilities that a bomb had been
planted (ranging from 1/6 to 1; termed “environmental threat”
and abbreviated “EnvThreat” in the ﬁgures). If it was planted,
then it would be placed randomly at any of the 12 sites; so its
probability of it exploding increased with the number of tokens
presented on a trial (colored in white; i.e., Fig. 1A shows a gamble
with 4 activated tokens), ranging from 1 to 6 pairs. Thus, the prob-
ability of an activated bomb (P(ActBomb)) is
( ) = ( ) × ( | )
= ×
P P PActBomb Bomb planted Bomb activated planted
Env Threat
No. of activated tokens
12
A maximum of one bomb was planted in a gamble on any
given trial. Over the course of the experiment, subjects faced
different combinations of 6 environmental threats and 6 levels
of activated tokens. The task space thus comprised a 6 × 6 fac-
torial design (environmental threat, number of tokens), totaling
36 unique gambles.
In the Ap/Av condition, subjects had 3 choices: accept (i.e.,
attempt to gather the rewards), reject (i.e., avoid the gamble), or
explore. Accepting a gamble that did not contain an activated
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bomb resulted in subjects winning money (10p/token). However,
accepting a gamble that did contain an activated bomb led to a
ﬁxed loss of −120p. Because the number of activated tokens add-
itionally signaled how much money was available to win on a
given trial, increasing the number of activated tokens simultan-
eously increased both potential winnings and P(ActBomb)), given
the same environmental threat. Rejecting a gamble effectively
discarded the gamble without incurring either gain or loss.
Exploring required paying a 20p fee to discover whether or not
there was a bomb under 50% of the tokens (Fig. 1A, bottom left). If
subjects chose to explore on a trial in which the bomb was under
a token, then there was a 50% chance that they would ﬁnd this
during exploration. Subjects could only explore once per trial.
After exploring, they then had to decide whether to accept or
reject the gamble, which then had the same pecuniary conse-
quences as at the ﬁrst stage. This procedure allowed us to separ-
ate avoidance and exploratory risk assessment, something that
previous studies have not attempted.
In the Ap/Ap condition, subjects faced the same gambles (i.e.,
the same combinations of environmental threat and number of
activated tokens, indicating the same P(ActBomb). However,
instead of choosing to accept or reject the gamble, subjects had to
guess whether it contained an activated bomb or not (Fig. 1A, bot-
tom right). Subjects won money (10p/token) for each correct
guess and incurred neither gain nor loss for incorrect guesses. As
in the Ap/Av condition, subjects had the opportunity to explore
the gamble (incurring the same 20p fee) before making their deci-
sion. Therefore, the Ap/Ap task required subjects to represent the
available information and compute P(ActBomb) in a similar man-
ner to the Ap/Av condition, but without the possibility of loss
and, therefore, without any attendant avoidance.
Experimental Procedure
One day prior to scanning, subjects completed a learning session, a
session of the Ap/Av condition and a session of the Ap/Ap condi-
tion. During the learning session, the game was explained, and
subjects learned the environmental threat associated with each
background color by observing trials in which they were forced to
accept gambles on every trial. On those trials, the outcomes fol-
lowed the Ap/Av condition, that is, subjects lost money if an acti-
vated bomb was present, and otherwise won money proportional
to the number of tokens on the trial (see Supplementary materials
for detail). At the end of this training session, subjects completed a
2-alternative-forced-choice task in which they chose between 2 of
the background colors at a time, and gave explicit ratings of the
probability of a bomb being planted for each background color.
Subjects whose performance on the explicit ratings or the forced-
choice task indicated that they had failed to learn the order of the
background colors (i.e., each of their rankings in terms of environ-
mental threat) were excluded from further participation in the
task. Winnings from this learning session did not count toward
subjects’ monetary rewards, to prevent subjects from adopting a
risk-averse strategy for subsequent sessions. Subjects then com-
pleted a session of the Ap/Av condition, followed by a session of
the Ap/Ap condition, in which they made choices (accept/choose
no bomb, reject/choose bomb, and explore) and observed the out-
come on every trial (see Supplementary materials for detail).
Subjects also explicitly ranked the background colors, and com-
pleted the same 2-alternative-forced-choice task (i.e., choosing
between the background colors) after each session. We excluded
from further participation subjects who 1) changed their ranking of
the background colors in terms of ascending environmental threat
after either of the Ap/Av or Ap/Ap task session (as this indicated a
change of mind regarding the background colors from the training
session); 2) indicated either in their rankings or in their behavior
that they had mixed up the order of the background colors with
respect to the associated threat levels (see Supplementary Fig. 5A,
top, for examples); 3) failed to explore entirely (see Supplementary
Fig. 5A, bottom, for examples); 4) could not verbally explain how
information from the environmental threat and number of acti-
vated tokens should be combined to estimate P(ActBomb), which
had been explained to them before the start of the experiment.
These strict screening procedures were employed in order to select
for fMRI the subjects who had best learned the structure of the
task. This ensures that scanned participants robustly show the
behavior that we were interested to study and increases the statis-
tical power of our design. Furthermore, this allowed us to ensure
that the scanned subjects would have reasonably similar estimates
of P(ActBomb) across the 6 × 6 task space, and so ensure that the
psychological variables that were controlled for in our fMRI model
were reasonably accurate (Fig. 1B; see later sections for more
detail). Despite these strict exclusion criteria, available choice
behavior for the excluded subjects in these training sessions was,
on average, similar to that of the included subjects (Supplementary
Fig. 5B). Indeed, analysis of the choice probabilities with a group
(included vs. excluded) × condition × choice ANOVA found no sig-
niﬁcant effects related to the subject group (all P > 0.3), though a
main effect of choice and condition × choice interaction were
found for the reported results when the sample was restricted to
the high performers. This implies that there is continuity between
included and excluded subjects and that the results of our experi-
ment are generalizable.
During the fMRI session (performed the day after initial train-
ing and screening), we collected fMRI data while subjects com-
pleted 12 alternating blocks of the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap condition
with the starting condition counterbalanced across subjects
(Fig. 1C). Subjects were told that the P(ActBomb) associated with
each gamble was the same as in previous sessions, and that this
last session was an opportunity for them to use what they had
learned so far to maximize their winnings in the game. The over-
all amount of money paid to subjects was proportional to overall
accumulative winnings in the game (i.e., all sessions excluding
the initial learning session).
All fMRI results presented relate to the stage of the trial
sequence in which subjects were ﬁrst evaluating gambles and
indicating their choices (indicated by the blue bar in Fig. 1C,
left). Activation relating to this evaluation period was decorre-
lated with processing of the outcome and any explored infor-
mation, by omitting the latter 2 stages during 50% of the fMRI
trials and including nuisance regressors describing these latter
2 stages in our fMRI models. Subjects were told that incomplete
“explore” trials would be completed after the scanning session,
but no such postscanning session was actually conducted, and
subjects’ winnings for these trials were calculated by assuming
that second-stage choice would conform deterministically to
the information revealed during exploration. Subjects were
only informed about how winnings for these incomplete
explore trials were calculated after all scanning was completed.
The fMRI stage of the experiment consisted of 1296 trials (18
repetitions of the 36 Ap/Av and 36 Ap/Ap trials), and subjects
were offered a break after every other block. Only behavioral
data from this stage were analyzed.
Overview of the Data Analysis
We ﬁrst analyzed our behavioral and fMRI data using a model-
agnostic approach that focused on choice in the different
Parsing the Role of the Hippocampus in Approach–Avoidance Conﬂict Loh et al. | 3
 at U
niversity College London on January 9, 2017
http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
experimental conditions. We followed this with a model-based
analysis that enabled us to examine latent quantities (notably,
subjective value) that might be used to guide strategic choice in
our task. Behavioral modeling was employed to calculate the
subjective values underlying choice in the task.
Characterization of Task Space with Respect to
Psychological Learning-Related Variables
We characterized the 6 × 6 task space in terms of several task-
related variables that might be tracked at a psychological or
neural level across the 6 × 6 task space (Fig. 1B). These variables
were as follows: environmental threat, number of activated
tokens, P(ActBomb), the uncertainty or entropy associated with
this probability (as deﬁned by Strange et al. 2005) and EV of
nonexploration, calculated in the Ap/Av condition as:
= − × ( ) + × ( − ( )) ( )P n PEV 12 ActBomb 1 ActBomb 1
where n is the number of tokens. In the Ap/Ap condition, EV
was
= ( ( ) ( )) ( )V VEV max Bomb , No Bomb 2
( ) = ( − ( )) ×V P nNo Bomb 1 ActBomb
( ) = ( ) ×V P nBomb ActBomb
While EV in the Ap/Av condition reﬂects the value of accept-
ing the gamble, EV in the Ap/Ap condition reﬂects the amount
of money that subjects may win if they make an accurate
choice in the task. All variables (other than EV) took the same
values across the task space in the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap condi-
tions. However, the interpretation of P(ActBomb) differed
between the 2 tasks, indicating the probability of losing money
in the Ap/Av but not in the Ap/Ap conditions. These task-
related variables served as the starting point with which to
construct the computational models. The maximal correlation
between these variables was r = −0.86, between P(ActBomb)
and EV.
Behavioral Modeling
Only choices from the fMRI session (i.e., after complete learn-
ing) were modeled, and choice on each trial was assumed to be
independent. The model space was deﬁned by ﬁrst calculating
the true EVs of accepting/choosing no bomb, rejecting/choosing
bomb and exploring, and then parameterizing 7 separate pos-
sible sources of suboptimal inﬂuence over these values (see
Supplementary materials for detail). The potential sources of
suboptimality were identiﬁed by considering both errors in
optimal calculation (j parameter: mis-estimation of EnvThreat;
m parameter: systematic miscalculation of the P(ActBomb) after
one explores and fails to see a bomb), as well as descriptive
psychological tendencies that could interfere with optimal per-
formance (f parameter: loss aversion; e parameter: a tendency
for overvalue exploration in some circumstances; i parameter:
a tendency to act according to null information revealed during
exploration, rather than integrating this information into a
revised estimate of P(ActBomb)).
In the winning behavioral models, the values in the Ap/Av
condition (quantiﬁed in terms of tokens) were calculated as
follows:
( ) = × + ( − ) × ( )V a f a nAccept 1 3
( ) =V Reject 0
( ) = ( ) × ( ) + ( ) × ( )
− + ×
= ×
( ) =
( ) =
( ) = −
( ) = × + ( − ) × >
= ( )
V P V P V
u w
a
P a
V
P a
V k f k n
Explore See See No See No See
2
Env Threat n/12
See
See 0
No See 1
No See 1 if 0
0 otherwise gamble rejected
j
m m
1
2
1
2
where a is the subjective probability of an activated bomb, f is
the perceived magnitude of the ﬁxed loss (which objectively
equals −12 tokens), n is the number of activated tokens on that
trial, j is a power law distortion of environmental threat, “See”
describes the state of having seen an activated bomb during
exploration (and whose value is 0 in the Ap/Av condition
because it is assumed that a subject would reject the gamble at
the second stage), “No see” describes not having seen an acti-
vated bomb during exploration, u is uncertainty regarding the
probability of an activated bomb, w is an exploration bonus that
quantiﬁes the impact that uncertainty has on V(Explore), k is
the posterior probability of an activated bomb given that explor-
ation does not reveal an activated bomb (calculated using Bayes
rule), and m is a power law distortion of k (i.e., describing sub-
optimal calculation of the posterior probability). We allowed for
distortion of the posterior probability k to allow for the possibil-
ity that subjects may incorrectly integrate information from
exploration to form updated estimates of P(ActBomb), despite
having been well trained on the base rates of P(ActBomb) from
the start.
Values in the Ap/Ap task were as follows:
( ) = ( − ) × ( )V a nAccept 1 4
( ) = ×V a nReject
( ) = ( ) × ( ) + ( ) × ( )
+ + ×
V P V P V
e u w
Explore See See No See No See
= ×a Env Threat No of Tokens/12j
( ) =P aSee 1
2
( ) =V nSee
( ) = −P aNo See 1 1
2
( ) = >V V V VNo See ifStage 2 Accept Stage 2 No Bomb Stage 2 Bomb
= V otherwiseStage 2 Reject
= ( − ) × +V k n i1 mStage 2 Accept
= ×V k nmStage 2 Reject
where V(See) = n (assuming subjects correctly indicate “bomb” on
such trials), the variable exploration bonus w here quantiﬁes the
effect of uncertainty (u) on V(Explore), i describes a bonus to VStage
2 No Bomb, reﬂecting a general tendency to choose no bomb in
which exploration does not reveal a bomb (as opposed to
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optimally integrating the null information into an estimate of P
(ActBomb)).
Values for each choice were then used to predict the probabil-
ity of accepting/choosing no bomb, rejecting/choosing bomb, or
exploring on each trial via a softmax function. Separate models
were included for all possible combinations of all free parameters
considered (see Supplementary materials for detail; all ﬁtted par-
ameter values shown in Supplementary Table 6). Parameter ﬁt-
ting was implemented separately for the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap
conditions using a hierarchical type II Bayesian (random effects)
procedure that used maximum likelihood to ﬁt simple parame-
terized distributions for higher level statistics of the parameters
(Huys et al. 2011). Models were compared using the integrated
Bayesian information criterion (iBIC), in which small iBIC values
indicate a model that ﬁts the data better after penalizing for the
number of parameters (to prevent over-ﬁtting).
fMRI Analysis
Data were acquired with a functional resolution of 3mm isotropic
(structural resolution: 1.3mm isotropic), and preprocessed prior to
full analysis (see Supplementary materials for detail). Three differ-
ent general linear models (GLMs) were constructed, to analyze
data from several different perspectives: 1) “categorical choice,” 2)
“chosen and counterfactual value,” and 3) “choice × value differ-
ence.” All models focused on the 2000-ms epoch during which the
gambles were presented onscreen, wherein subjects had to make
their choices (i.e., indicated by the blue bar in Fig. 1C).
Orthogonalization of parametric modulators was omitted in the
design matrix for all models, so as to ensure that parameter esti-
mates relating to the regressors and parametric modulators com-
pete for variance (Andrade et al. 1999). The outcome-presentation
and exploration stages were omitted during 50% of all trials, in
order to enable us to decorrelate the gamble evaluation and choice
stage from all other stages in our task design. These events were
also included as nuisance regressors in all fMRI models.
The categorical choice model included choice regressors that
sorted trials according to choice and/or condition, and several
parametric modulators describing the psychological variables
across the 6 × 6 task space: environmental threat, number of
tokens, P(ActBomb), uncertainty and EV (Fig. 1B; all psychological
variables were modeled separately for the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap con-
ditions). The 6 choice regressors consisted of accept/choose no
bomb, reject/choose bomb and explore choices in the Ap/Av ver-
sus Ap/Ap condition. Because the main effect of choice and condi-
tion × choice contrasts revealed distinct but partially-overlapping
clusters in the hippocampus, we followed standard procedures
and mutually masked 2 contrasts against each other (at a thresh-
old of P = 0.05 uncorrected) in order to identify signals that cleanly
showed signals of each kind. Note that the masking procedure is
necessary in order to identify signals that are not contaminated
by each other. However, this also means that voxels demonstrat-
ing a mix of signals do not show up in this analysis. For transpar-
ency, we show voxels that demonstrated a conjunction of main
effect of choice and condition × choice effects in Supplementary
Figure 6B. Mutual masking applied only to the hippocampal sig-
nals, because this is where the 2 different signals were observed;
see Results.
In the chosen and counterfactual value and choice × value dif-
ference models, we looked for values signals in the brain that
subjects might be using to make strategic choices in our task. The
winning behavioral models were used to calculate the values of
the chosen and best unchosen options on each trial, as well as
the difference between the chosen and counterfactual options
(Fig. 5C). In the chosen and counterfactual value model, paramet-
ric modulators for the chosen and counterfactual value were
included (separately for the Ap/Av vs. Ap/Ap conditions) in the
ﬁrst-level GLM. In the choice × value difference model, we mod-
eled the value differences (V[Chosen] – V[Best Unchosen]) on
each trial, splitting trials into whether gambles were rejected on
that trial or not (or, in the Ap/Ap condition, whether subjects
chose “Bomb” or not).
Further details of model setup are included in the
Supplementary materials. Aside from these main fMRI models,
further fMRI analysis was conducted to verify that the choice
effects noted here were robust to the omission of task-related
nuisance variables included in the categorical choice model.
Additionally, we constructed region of interest (ROI) estimates of
the CA1 and CA3 subﬁelds in order to estimate if the choice-
related results corresponded to known anatomical subdivisions
within the hippocampus. These analyses are described in full in
the Supplementary materials.
Finally, we highlight the fact that all fMRI analysis was con-
ducted in the native space of the group-level template that was
constructed using our spatial normalization protocols (see
Supplementary materials for full detail). As such, all coordinates
reported are not in MNI space. To aim comparison with other
studies, all hippocampal clusters are labeled, in coronal slices,
with their mm distance relative to the ﬁrst coronal slice in which
the uncus ﬁrst appears (moving from the posterior to the anterior
of the brain). This coronal slice was chosen because the uncus is
a major and easily identiﬁable landmark in the hippocampus,
and thus is commonly used in hippocampal segmentation proto-
cols. Note additionally that the activation cluster extends into the
space between the hippocampal graymatter and the amygdala in
Figure 3A; this is likely result of the smoothing procedures that
are applied as a standard preprocessing step with fMRI data, com-
bined with the presence of large draining veins in this region of
the brain (Lai et al. 1993).
All results were signiﬁcant at a threshold of at P < 0.05 FWE
(Family-wise error corrected; with an initial threshold of P <
0.001 uncorrected and small-volume correction for the bilateral
hippocampus). Where interactions were noted in the voxel-
based analysis, we opted to clarify these interactions by exam-
ining the simple-effect contrasts within Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM), as this allowed us to maintain a consistent
threshold of P < 0.05 FWE. For the choice × value difference
model, we employed a functional ROI approach whereby the
functional ROIs were not identiﬁed using the same model in
question (Supplementary Table 7 shows the mean extent to
which regressors in the 2 value models are correlated, within
subject). For this analysis, we conducted statistical tests on the
extracted parameter estimates.
Results
We ﬁrst analyzed our behavioral and fMRI data using a model-
agnostic approach that focused on choice in the different
experimental conditions, without assuming the veracity of any
inferred psychological quantities (e.g., values). This analysis
aimed to examine whether the hippocampus, during the Ap/Av
condition, is selectively implicated in avoidance (i.e., rejecting)
or information gathering (exploration). This model-agnostic
analysis was then followed up with behavioral modeling and a
subsequent model-based analysis of the fMRI data that enabled
us to examine hidden informational quantities (i.e., value) that
might be used to guide strategic choice in our task, as well as
their neural instantiation.
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Dissociating Approach, Avoidance, and Exploration
in Approach–Avoidance Conﬂict
Subjects faced many different combinations of colored back-
grounds (indicating environmental threat, ranging from 2/6 to
1) and numbers of activated tokens (ranging from 2 to 12), and
had to combine these 2 pieces of information to calculate the
probability of an activated bomb (P(ActBomb)) on each trial (see
Materials and Methods for full detail). These gambles were fur-
ther encountered in 2 experimental conditions (in a within-
subjects design) The approach–avoidance (Ap/Av) condition
(Fig. 1A, bottom left) invoked an approach–avoidance conﬂict,
because increasing the number of tokens implied a greater
magnitude of potential reward (+10 p/token) as well as a greater
probability of a substantial loss (a planted bomb exploding,
leading to a −120 p loss). In the approach–approach (Ap/Ap)
condition, subjects faced the same gambles (i.e., indicating the
same P(ActBomb)), but without the threat of loss (since they
were rewarded for correctly guessing whether there was an
activated bomb or not, but were not penalized for being wrong).
Thus, any conﬂict experienced in the Ap/Ap condition
stemmed instead from uncertainty about whether the “bomb”
or “no bomb” choice options would be more likely to lead to
reward. Critically, participants made choices in response to the
same gambles (i.e., the same combination of background color
and number of tokens) in the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions.
This feature of the design allows us to isolate approach–avoid-
ance conﬂict in our comparison of the 2 conditions, while con-
trolling for working memory requirements, potential use of
spatial strategies that might otherwise invoke the hippocam-
pus, and other nonspeciﬁc effects. In both conditions, subjects
were able to “explore” (i.e., gather more information) the gam-
ble before making a ﬁnal decision.
The true EV of each choice is shown in Figure 1B (bottom left:
Ap/Av condition, bottom right: Ap/Ap condition), assuming opti-
mal subsequent behavior in the case of exploration. Although
choices in the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions are psychologically
distinct from each other, both accepting in the Ap/Av condition
and choosing “no bomb” in the Ap/Ap condition indicate a sub-
ject’s underlying belief that there is no activated bomb on that
trial. Similarly, both rejecting in the Ap/Av and declaring “bomb”
in the Ap/Ap indicate that a subject believes that there is an acti-
vated bomb on that trial. Subjects were ﬁrst extensively trained
on both the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions, separately (see
Materials and Methods for more detail). In the scanner, they then
performed 12 blocks of trials alternating between Ap/Av and Ap/
Ap conditions, with the condition clearly indicated onscreen at
all times to prevent confusion (Fig. 1C).
Figure 2 shows the percentage of accepting, rejecting, and
exploring in the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions, as well as the asso-
ciated response times (RTs). Overall, subjects’ choices appeared
to reﬂect an integration of information from the environmental
threat and the number of tokens. The trade-off between accept-
ing versus rejecting (in the Ap/Av condition) and choosing no
bomb versus bomb (in the Ap/Ap condition) appeared particularly
to track P(ActBomb). Analysis with a 2 × 3 (condition × choice)
ANOVA revealed a main effect of choice (F2,38 = 123.23, P < 0.001),
as well as a condition × choice interaction (F2,38 = 12.01, P < 0.001).
Paired t-test comparisons conﬁrmed that subjects were more
likely to accept (vs. choose “no bomb”), and less likely to reject
(vs. choose “bomb”), in the Ap/Ap (compared with the Ap/Av,
condition; Fig. 2B; Accept/No bomb: t(19) = 4.55, P < 0.001; Reject/
Bomb: t(19) = 3.50, P = 0.002). This indicates a relative conserva-
tism in accepting gambles in the Ap/Av condition, where incor-
rect decisions could cause instrumental loss. In contrast, subjects
were not more or less likely to explore overall in the Ap/Av versus
Ap/Ap condition (P > 0.3). As such, the Ap/Av conditions inﬂu-
enced the trade-off between accepting/choosing “no bomb” ver-
sus rejecting/choosing “bomb,” leaving the overall levels of
exploration relatively similar in the 2 conditions. In order to
determine whether the accumulative winnings payoff structure
signiﬁcantly impacted behavior over time, we split trials accord-
ing to whether they occurred in the initial, middle, and last thirds
of the experiment, and compared choice with a condition ×
choice × third (2 × 3 × 3) ANOVA. No signiﬁcant effects relating to
the section of the experimental session were found (all P > 0.4).
Figure 1. Experimental design. Subjects evaluated gambles (A, top) for the presence of an activated bomb. Gambles comprised different combinations of 6 background
colors (environmental threat) and 6 levels of activated tokens, combined to create a 6 × 6 task space (B). Choice in the Ap/Av condition (accept, reject vs. explore)
involved a risk of win or loss (A, bottom left), while choice in the control task (bomb, no bomb, explore) never resulted in loss (A, bottom right), and subjects were
rewarded for correctly guessing if a bomb was present or not (see Results/Experimental Procedure for detail). In the scanner, subjects made choices in response to
each gamble, with the condition (Ap/Av or Ap/Ap) clearly indicated onscreen (C). All fMRI results relate to the evaluation and choice period of the trial sequence (indi-
cated by blue bar in C, left), which was decorrelated from the outcome-presentation and exploration stages by omitting these latter stages in 50% of all trials.
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Subjects were also quicker to accept gambles in the Ap/Av condi-
tion, relative to choosing “no bomb” in the Ap/Ap condition (con-
dition × choice: F2,38 = 2.88, P = 0.068; Accept vs. No Bomb: t(19) = 3,
P = 0.005; P > 0.3 for other between-conditions choice compari-
sons. ME choice: F2,38 = 109.61, P < 0.001; ME condition: P =
0.069). Additionally, the extent of this trade-off correlated,
across all subjects, with individual differences in trait anxiety.
The difference between the probability of choosing No Bomb in
the Ap/Ap condition and the probability of accepting in the Ap/
Av condition was correlated to trait anxiety scores (rs = = 0.62,
P = 0.004). Similar correlations were present with Bomb versus
Reject responses, rs = −0.54, = 0.014, but not for exploration,
P > 0.1. These results indicate that the behavior elicited by the
approach–avoidance conﬂict in our task is related to the psy-
chological construct of anxiety (as measured by using the STAI
questionnaire).
Frontal, Striatal, and Parietal Regions Support
Exploratory Information Gathering
To analyze choice-related signals, we built an fMRI GLM to
identify neural regions associated with the different choices in
our task. This model-agnostic analysis focused solely on sub-
ject’s choices, without explicitly modeling the psychological
processes that may have been involved in making behavioral
choices (e.g., subjective value). In this and all following fMRI
models, we focused on the 2000-ms period (indicated by the
blue bar in Fig. 1C) when subjects evaluated the gambles and
made their choices. This ﬁrst model, referred to as the categor-
ical choice model (see Materials and Methods), categorically
modeled choice on each trial, separately for the Ap/Av and Ap/
Ap conditions (i.e., 2 × 3, condition × choice). In addition to the
6 regressors of interest, we included nuisance regressors that
modeled, on every trial, environmental threat, the number of
tokens, P(ActBomb), uncertainty, and expected value (EV) of the
gamble (Fig. 1B, see Materials and Methods for detail). Each
variable was modeled separately for the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap con-
ditions. Importantly, these nuisance variables were allowed to
compete for variance with the regressors of interest. By includ-
ing the nuisance regressors, we aimed to remove variance asso-
ciated with the task-related variables that varied systematically
across the task space, in order to identify blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) responses uniquely related to choice. As fur-
ther veriﬁcation, we examined choice signals using alternative
choice models, including a simpler model without these nuis-
ance regressors (Supplementary Fig. 1A).
We ﬁrst identiﬁed voxels that differentiated between choices
without distinguishing between the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions
(main effect of choice contrast at the second level). We found sig-
niﬁcant activation in the bilateral anterior hippocampus, extend-
ing into the amygdala (Fig. 3A; P < 0.05 FWE SVC for the bilateral
hippocampus alone, 15.21% of clusters’ voxels in the amygdala;
see Supplementary Table 1 for cluster statistics). Follow-up com-
parisons revealed that the main effect in the hippocampus was
driven by high activation when subjects rejected gambles in the
Ap/Av condition or similarly chose Bomb in the Ap/Ap condition,
and relative deactivation when they chose to explore. No other
region in the hippocampus showed greater activation when sub-
jects chose to explore rather than accept/choose no bomb or
reject/choose bomb. Instead, exploration was associated with
coactivation of frontal, parietal, and striatal regions.
A main effect of choice contrast also revealed activation in a
network of regions that included the right striatum, rostrolateral
frontopolar cortex (including BA10), middle frontal gyrus (includ-
ing BA46), superior frontal gyrus (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex;
DLPFC), striatum and parietal cortex; Figure 3B; see Supplementary
Table 1 for full statistics. Follow-up contrasts revealed a consistent
pattern of greater activation when subjects chose to explore, com-
pared with when they chose to accept/choose no bomb or reject/
choose bomb, in all these regions (see Fig. 3B for parameter esti-
mates from these clusters). No regions showed a signiﬁcantly
greater BOLD response when subjects accepted gambles/chose no
Figure 2. Behavioral choice. Subjects made strategic choices across the 6 × 6 task space (A). Accept and reject choices in the Ap/Av condition are analogous to the “no
bomb” and “bomb” choices in the Ap/Ap condition, with respect to the subject’s underlying belief regarding the presence of an activated bomb. The proportion of the
task space in which subjects generally chose “no bomb” in the Ap/Ap was larger compared with the proportion of accepted gambles in the Ap/Av condition (B), and
subjects were generally faster to accept subjectively safe gambles in the Ap/Av condition, relative to choosing “no bomb” in the Ap/Ap (note that mean RTs are in ms
prior to log transformation, with true values ranging from 750 to 1200ms). Additionally, the extent to which subjects adjusted behavior in response to approach–
avoidance conﬂict was correlated, across all subjects (n = 20), with individual differences in anxiety: anxious subjects were more likely to omit accepting gambles on
which they thought there was likely to be no activated bomb (C).
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bomb (compared with rejecting/choosing bomb or exploring),
which may have resulted from our controlling for quantities like
EV and number of tokens in the fMRI model.
Although we did not ﬁnd evidence for hippocampal activation
when participants chose to explore, the regions identiﬁed are in
line with existing ﬁndings on exploration in decision-making.
One alternative possibility that arises from Gray and
McNaughton’s (2000) hypothesis is that the hippocampus may be
speciﬁcally recruited in exploration in response to approach–
avoidance conﬂict rather than exploration more generally. To
examine this possibility, we directly contrasted exploration in the
Ap/Av versus Ap/Ap condition (ignoring accept/choose no bomb
and reject/choose bomb choices), again using the voxel-based
approach. This speciﬁc contrast did not reveal any signiﬁcant
activation in the hippocampus, or elsewhere in the brain. Thus,
these results do not support the hypothesis that the hippocam-
pus is involved in initiating exploratory risk-assessment behavior
in the context of approach/avoidance conﬂict, as hypothesized by
Gray and McNaughton (2000). Instead, exploration in both the Ap/
Av and Ap/Ap conditions was supported by a network of regions
commonly implicated in decision-making and executive control
(Daw et al. 2006; Badre et al. 2012). These results indicate that
exploration in an approach–avoidance context is not qualitatively
different from exploration in a broader decision-making context.
Subregions of the Anterior Hippocampus Are
Speciﬁcally and Selectively Recruited During Avoidance
in An Aversive Context
Our previous analysis did not identify any signiﬁcant voxels
that distinguished exploration in the 2 conditions. Using the
same fMRI model, we next examined the condition × choice
interaction contrast to identify brain regions that responded
differentially to choice in the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions. This
is the key contrast of interest for our study, as we were
interested in examining hippocampal contributions to choice
that differed in the context of approach–avoidance conﬂict. We
found signiﬁcant clusters in the bilateral inferior anterior
hippocampus (Fig. 4A, blue; P < 0.05 FWE SVC for the bilateral
hippocampus; see Supplementary Table 1 for cluster details
and Supplementary Figure 6A for comparison of this ROI with
the anatomically deﬁned amygdala).
To identify which choices were involved in driving this
interaction, we looked for activation in these clusters for the
contrasts relating to condition × reject/choose bomb versus
explore, condition × accept/choose no bomb versus reject/
choose bomb, and condition × accept/choose no bomb versus
explore. The effects were driven by differences in rejecting/
choosing bomb versus exploring in the 2 conditions (at P <
0.001, signiﬁcant activation in these clusters observed for the
condition × reject/choose bomb vs. explore contrast, but not
the others). Speciﬁcally, while these regions showed greater
activation when subjects rejected gambles in the Ap/Av condi-
tion, they were relatively deactivated when subjects faced the
analogous decision in the Ap/Ap condition (Fig. 4A). This indi-
cates a speciﬁc role for inferior anterior hippocampus when
subjects act to avoid a possible loss, as distinguished from
acknowledging the presence of a hypothetical threat that could
not harm them. Additionally, the strength of this left hippo-
campal response (reject > explore in the Ap/Av condition) was
positively correlated across subjects with individual differences
in anxiety (Fig. 4B; trait anxiety: rs = 0.54, P = 0.014; P > 0.1 for
the right hippocampal cluster).
To avoid confounds between choice effects and task-related
quantities, our fMRI model included regressors for various task-
related psychological variables (including EV and P(ActBomb);
Fig. 1B). This allowed us to identify the hippocampus’ role in
the behavioral avoidance of aversive threat beyond the passive
tracking of P(ActBomb). In a conﬁrmatory analysis, using a sim-
pler categorical choice model without the nuisance variables,
Figure 3. Context-independent choice effects. While the superior anterior hippocampus showed relative “deactivation” when subjects explored (A), a network of
frontal, striatal, and parietal regions were implicated in exploration (B). All clusters are shown at P < 0.001, overlaid on the group-level mean anatomical scan. Note
that the clusters in the hippocampus shown here and in Figure 4A included mutual masking of the main effect of choice and condition × choice contrasts, as is com-
mon practice within SPM when examining overlaying effects (see Materials and Methods for more detail). The coronal slice shown in (A) is 6.5mm anterior to the ﬁrst
coronal slice in which the uncus appears (moving from posterior to anterior in the brain; see Materials and Methods for more detail).
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we found the same choice-related results (Supplementary Fig.
1A). This demonstrates that the choice-related results identi-
ﬁed in the main analysis are not an artifact of the nuisance
regressors that we controlled for in the full choice model. To
further verify these results, we also conducted further analysis
examining choice in a more restricted portion of the task space.
We were able to verify that the anterior hippocampus robustly
distinguished between avoiding in the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap condi-
tions, even when analysis was restricted to the portion of the
task space in which P(ActBomb) remained relatively unchanged
(Supplementary Fig. 2A).
Finally, we considered the possibility that the results in the
inferior anterior hippocampus may have been confounded by
greater subjective (rather than objective) uncertainty when sub-
jects rejected in the Ap/Av condition, relative to choosing bomb
in the Ap/Ap condition. We examined choice entropy as an
index of subjective uncertainty across the different choices
(Supplementary Fig. 2B) and showed that our ﬁndings are
unlikely to be confounded by greater subjective uncertainty in
the Ap/Av condition. Additionally, the results in the inferior
hippocampus were robust to the inclusion of RTs (a proxy for
trial-to-trial subjective uncertainty) in the fMRI model (i.e., as
regressors of no interest; see Supplementary Fig. 2C for detail).
These further analyses rule out the possibility that the inferior
hippocampal results were merely reﬂective of differences in
the subjective uncertainty between these 2 choice types.
We noted that the clusters showing a main effect of choice
and those showing a condition × choice interaction were con-
sistently segregated within the anterior hippocampus: voxels
showing main effect of choice were relatively superior to voxels
showing a condition × choice interaction, on both the left and
the right (Fig. 4A), as well as in individual subjects’ native space
(Supplementary Fig. 1B). Comparing our functional clusters
with anatomical atlases and reference images in which hippo-
campal subﬁelds had been manually segmented according to
anatomical features (Wisse et al. 2012; Duvernoy 2013), we
noted that the voxels that demonstrated a main effect of choice
(Fig. 4A, red) overlapped bilaterally with the CA3 subﬁeld of the
hippocampus, with extensions into the amygdala. On the other
hand, voxels showing a condition × choice interaction over-
lapped mostly with the CA1 subﬁeld on the right and CA1/DG
on the left, with extensions into the subiculum, bilaterally. A
similar overlap with the CA1 subﬁeld was observed in our add-
itional analysis focusing on those trials in which rejecting
choices traded off with exploration (Supplementary Fig. 2A). As
such, robust discrimination between rejecting in an instrumen-
tally aversive versus neutral context emerged most robustly in
the inferior hippocampus, where the CA1 cells are located.
However, despite their close proximity, voxels in the superior
hippocampus and possibly corresponding to CA3 demonstrated
a distinct pattern of choice-related effects: activation when
subjects believed there was an activated bomb without distin-
guishing between the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions (Fig. 3A).
Although the spatial resolution of our functional data limited
our ability to conﬁdently segment all the hippocampal subﬁelds,
we were able to build estimated anatomical ROIs of CA3 and CA1
based on the group anatomical image (Supplementary Fig. 3A;
see Supplementary materials for detail). Using these ROIs, we
then observed that a similar main effect of choice and condition
by choice interaction could be found in the left CA3, and bilateral
CA1, respectively (Supplementary Fig. 3B; see Supplementary
materials for more detail). These ﬁndings, while exploratory,
highlight the possibility that the different functional signals
within the anterior hippocampus may map onto anatomically
distinct subregions, and suggest that threat avoidance speciﬁcally
may implicate the inferior sections of the anterior hippocampus,
where CA1 neurons are typically located.
Behavioral Modeling
The results implicate a network of frontal, parietal, and striatal
regions in exploratory risk assessment. Additionally, they
Figure 4. The anterior hippocampus supports behavioral avoidance. Voxels in the inferior anterior hippocampus discriminated between rejecting gambles in the
Ap/Av condition and choosing “bomb” in the Ap/Ap condition (A). While both these trial types were associated with subjects believing that there was likely to be an
activated bomb, the Ap/Av condition alone invoked an additional avoidance response, due to the potential for instrumental loss. In contrast, the superior anterior
hippocampus (A, red; extending slightly into the amygdala) failed to discriminate between these 2 trial types, despite their markedly different psychological impact.
Additionally, the strength of this response in the left inferior anterior hippocampus correlated across all subjects (n = 20) with measures of anxiety (B). The coronal
slice shown in (A) is 5.2mm anterior to the ﬁrst coronal slice in which the uncus appears.
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implicate the anterior hippocampus in the avoidance of aver-
sive outcomes. In addition to these model-agnostic choice
effects, we were interested in identifying value-related signals
that underpinned subjects’ decisions to accept/choose no
bomb, reject/choose bomb or explore when faced with the dif-
ferent gambles. To calculate these value signals, we ﬁt a family
of decision models to subjects’ choices, parameterizing devia-
tions from behavior that would be optimal according to the
objective contingencies. Models calculated values on each trial
for each of the 3 possible actions (accept/choose no bomb,
reject/choose bomb, explore), which were then translated into
choice probabilities via a softmax rule. Potential sources of sub-
optimality (e.g., loss aversion, mis-estimation of environmental
threat) were also considered in our model space (see Materials
and Methods for more detail, and Supplementary materials for
full detail of all possible parameters considered). We used
Bayesian model comparison to select the model that best cap-
tured observed behavior.
In both the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions, the winning model
(detailed below) explained the data very well (pseudo-r2= 0.64
and 0.62 for Ap/Av and Ap/Ap, respectively). BICs for the win-
ning model compared with adjacent models in the model space
(i.e., that omit individual parameters) are presented in
Figure 5A (see Supplementary Fig. 4B for BIC values across the
entire model space considered). Additionally, simulated choice
predicted by the winning models (Fig. 5B) closely reproduced
the pattern of observed behavior (see Fig. 2A for comparison).
Reﬂecting the ability of the model to predict choice, simulated
behavior reﬂected the same relationship between individual
differences in choice and trait anxiety as observed in the data
(predicted difference between the probability of choosing no
bomb and the probability of accepting was correlated with trait
anxiety; rs = 0.51, P = 0.02).
The winning models showed that subjects slightly underva-
lued or underestimated the magnitude of the ﬁxed loss in our
task (described by the f parameter; mean subjective value =
−10.03 tokens; true = −12 tokens; see Materials and Methods and
Supplementary materials for detail on all parameters). At the time
of their initial choice, subjects over-valued accepting gambles/
choosing no bomb after exploration revealed no bomb, in both the
Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions (described by the i parameter).
Subjects’ underlying estimate of the environmental threat asso-
ciated with each background color were distorted relative to the
true probabilities (described by the j parameter), but environmen-
tal threat was not systematically under- or over-estimated by the
group as a whole (see Supplementary Fig. 4C for the average task
space experienced by subjects). Subjects were more likely to
explore than was optimal, and an exploration bonus linked to
uncertainty was found in both the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions
(described by the w parameter). This means that subjects were
more likely to explore on trials in which uncertainty was high (see
Supplementary Materials and Methods for more detail on other
candidate variables that were considered as a potential modulator
of exploration).
Hippocampal Values Signals Are Magniﬁed
in the Context of Approach/Avoidance
Signals relating to the value of chosen and counterfactual (i.e.,
unchosen, competing) alternatives are thought to be important
in guiding choice. Accordingly, we built an fMRI model (referred
to as the Chosen and Counterfactual Value model in the
Materials and Methods), with the values of the chosen and best
unchosen options (as predicted using the winning behavioral
models; Fig. 5C) as parametric modulators on each trial.
Consistent with previous work, we found neural signals that
Figure 5. Behavioral modeling and value signals. Bayesian model comparison was used to select the winning model from a large model space; BICs for selected mod-
els are shown in (A). The winning models were able to closely reproduce the overall pattern of choice observed in both the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions (B; see Fig. 2A
for observed behavior). Values relating to the chosen and counterfactual options, as well as the value difference between the 2, were employed in our fMRI analysis
(C). The vmPFC, ventral striatum, and other regions tracked this value difference positively (D, red), whereas other regions like the parietal cortex, inferior frontal
gyrus, and DLPFC tracked V(Best Unchosen) > V(Chosen) (D, yellow).
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tracked subjective chosen values (i.e., V[Chosen] > V[Best
Unchosen]) in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and ven-
tral striatum (Fig. 5D; see Supplementary Table 4 for full list of
activation and statistics). Additionally, regions like the dor-
somedial prefrontal cortex and DLPFC extending to the frontal
pole were observed to track counterfactual values (V[Best
Unchosen] > V[Chosen]).
To identify neural value signals that were modulated by the
approach–avoidance context, we included these same value
regressors in a second-level 2 × 2, condition (Ap/Av vs. Ap/Ap
task) × value (V[Chosen] vs. V[Best Unchosen]) model, and
examined the interaction contrast. Only the superior hippo-
campus, extending into the amygdala (35.21% of clusters’ vox-
els in the amygdala), showed a signiﬁcant interaction between
value and task (Fig. 6A; SVC for the bilateral hippocampus; left:
peak at −21.8, 6.7, 12.9, 183 voxels, T = 4.05, peak FWE P = 0.037;
right: peak at 19.2, 11.0, 11.8, 183 voxels, T = 4.32, peak FWE P =
0.018). Examination of the follow-up contrasts within this inter-
action indicated that this interaction was driven by stronger
tracking of value differences (i.e., V[Chosen] > V[Best
Unchosen]) in the Ap/Av compared with the Ap/Ap condition.
Since our results implicated hippocampus in rejecting gam-
bles, we conducted a ﬁnal analysis to examine whether these
potentiated hippocampal value signals were modulated by
choice. We built a ﬁnal fMRI model that included value differ-
ences (i.e., V[Chosen] > V[Best Unchosen]; Fig. 5C) separately
depending on whether the gamble was rejected or not on each
trial (referred to as choice × value difference in the Materials
and Methods). Note that we focused on value differences rather
than V(Chosen) and V(Best Unchosen) separately, since V
(Chosen) was always equivalent to 0 when subjects opted to
reject in the Ap/Av condition. Within this ﬁrst-level model, we
focused on the functional ROI that had been identiﬁed in the
previous analysis (i.e., Fig. 6A), extracting parameter estimates
from these superior hippocampal clusters, and analyzing them
with a 2 × 2 (condition × choice) ANOVA. Note that the choice
by value difference by condition contrast examined here is
orthogonal to value difference by condition contrast used to
deﬁne the functional ROIs.
This ﬁnal analysis revealed an interaction between condi-
tion and choice and value difference (see Table 1 for full statis-
tics; note the interaction remains a statistical trend on the left,
although ROI × choice × value type interaction, P > 0.9). The
interaction was driven by value difference signals that were
signiﬁcantly stronger on nonrejected trials in the Ap/Av condi-
tion (Fig. 6B), compared with both the signals on nonreject trials
in the Ap/Ap condition, as well as to the signals on reject trials
in the Ap/Av condition. These results suggest that superior hip-
pocampal value signals were potentiated speciﬁcally on trials
in which subjects omitted to reject in the Ap/Av condition but
not in the Ap/Ap condition. Motivated by the extension of the
value signals into the amygdala (Fig. 6A), we additionally con-
ducted an exploratory analysis in order to examine the role of
the amygdala in signaling value along with the hippocampus,
and found qualitatively similar value signals in the right amyg-
dala (albeit with a nonsigniﬁcant interaction) but not the left
(see Supplementary Fig. 6E for full detail).
The potentiation of value signals on nonreject trials in the
Ap/Av condition relative to the Ap/Ap condition is consistent
with a role for the hippocampus, potentially aided by the right
amygdala, in monitoring nonavoidant choices in the context of
approach–avoidance conﬂict. Interestingly, these value signals
were observed in the superior hippocampus, which had not dis-
tinguished between rejecting in the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap condi-
tions using the categorical choice model. The ﬁndings indicate
that value signals are potentiated in the superior anterior hippo-
campus when subjects face conditions in which threats are
instrumentally relevant, but perhaps to a degree that is insufﬁ-
cient to motivate avoidance. In contrast, when actions are taken
to avoid instrumental threats, the superior hippocampus shows
no such potentiation in its value signals, and the inferior hippo-
campus instead is implicated in a choice-related manner.
Discussion
We examined hippocampal contributions to approach–avoid-
ance conﬂict by developing a novel decision-making task that
separated behavioral avoidance (reject) from the decision to
gather more information (explore). We compared behavior and
neural signals in the context of Ap/Av conﬂict to behavioral
and neural signals in the context of Ap/Ap conﬂict. Whereas
the former involves conﬂicting approach and avoidance ten-
dencies because of the possibility of a big loss, any conﬂict or
ambiguity about the best course of action in the latter stems
Figure 6. Hippocampal value signals. Value signals in the superior hippocampus (extending slightly into the amygdala) were potentiated in the Ap/Av condition, com-
pared with the Ap/Ap (A). These potentiated value signals were driven by trials on which subjects omitted to reject gambles in the Ap/Ap condition (B). In the Ap/Av
condition, stronger tracking of value (i.e., comparing the Ap/Av and Ap/Ap conditions) was observed on trials in which subjects accepted or explored gambles in the
Ap/Av condition, compared with 1) choosing “no bomb” or exploring in the Ap/Ap condition, as well as compared with 2) rejecting in the experimental condition
(note the interaction is a statistical trend for the left hippocampus). The coronal slice shown in (A) is 6.5mm anterior to the ﬁrst coronal slice in which the uncus
appears, and the sattigal slices, labeled L (left) and R (right), are respectively 28.6mm left and 32.5mm right of the midline.
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from conﬂicting approach impulses. We observed 2 different
functional signals in the anterior hippocampus related to
behavioral avoidance. First, the inferior anterior hippocampus
was selectively activated when subjects acted to avoid a poten-
tial loss in the context of approach–avoidance conﬂict, to a
degree that covaried with individual differences in trait anxiety
in our sample of 20 subjects. Second, the superior anterior
hippocampus demonstrated value signals that were poten-
tiated by an approach–avoidance context, speciﬁcally on trials
in which subjects omitted to avoid potential threats.
These ﬁndings support the idea that the hippocampus is
involved in both monitoring and behavioral control in the con-
text of approach–avoidance conﬂict. Such conﬂict between
approach and avoidance impulses is contrasted with other
forms of conﬂict that require animals to decide between con-
ﬂicting courses of action in the absence of Pavlovian conﬂict
(e.g., in the Ap/Ap condition). In the superior hippocampus,
value signals were potentiated in an approach–avoidance con-
text, speciﬁcally for trials in which subjects omitted to reject (in
the Ap/Av condition). This signal may reﬂect hippocampal mon-
itoring of potential outcomes, under conditions where threats
are instrumentally relevant but insufﬁciently great to motivate
actual avoidance. In contrast, the choice-related effects in the
inferior hippocampus (i.e., greater activation when subjects
reject in an approach–avoidance context) are consistent with a
role for this region in coordinating avoidant action when threats
are sufﬁciently great for avoidance to be an imperative.
Dual monitoring and control modes have been previously
suggested in the literature (Gray and McNaughton 2000), but
are difﬁcult to demonstrate in rodents, because experimental
indices of threat awareness (e.g., freezing) are tightly linked to
behavioral control. Here, we identify expected outcomes as a
potential quantity that may be tracked specially by the hippo-
campus in order to implement monitoring in an approach–
avoidance context. By employing computational methods that
quantify the subjective values underlying choices, we were able
to examine hippocampal contributions to approach–avoidance
processing outside the limited set of circumstances that merit
a behavioral response.
A network of regions including the vmPFC and ventral stri-
atum demonstrated characteristic value difference signals (i.e.,
tracking V[Chosen] > V[Best Unchosen]; Fig. 5D), which may
reﬂect the brain’s sensitivity to quantities that are ultimately
used to guide strategic choice in our task. However, voxels in
the superior anterior hippocampus uniquely showed an inter-
action between value and Ap/Av condition. This indicates that
comparable changes in EVs in the Ap/Av condition resulted in a
steeper change in activation in the superior hippocampus, com-
pared with elsewhere in the brain (Fig. 6A). Previous work indi-
cates that values of competing options are represented in the
brain, and that competitive interactions between such neural
representations are important in determining behavioral choice
(Hayden et al. 2009). In this context, the hippocampus may serve
to potentiate value signals that invoke approach–avoidance con-
ﬂict, thereby sharply deﬁning the brain’s representation of com-
peting alternatives in situations where unfortunate decisions
may entail instrumental loss. Hippocampal representations of
ﬁctive, counterfactual experiences have been noted to play an
important role in decision-making (e.g., Wimmer and Shohamy
2012; Redish 2016). One intriguing possibility is that hippocam-
pal tracking of approach–avoidance outcomes may relate to its
broader role in representing episodic experiences in rich con-
textual detail (Tulving 1985; Burgess et al. 2002). For example,
situations of conﬂict between approach and avoidance may
implicitly motivate subjects to represent (ﬁctive) potential out-
comes more strongly and vividly. Alternatively, pattern comple-
tion processes within the hippocampal CA3 may result in a
wider network of episodic representations being reactivated in
the brain (Horner et al. 2015), leading to stronger or more vivid
representations of potential outcomes.
The categorical choice signals observed in the hippocampus
indicate that the hippocampus is recruited for avoidance in an
Ap/Av context, rather than in relation to exploration. The
strength of the avoidance-related response also correlated, across
all subjects, with individual differences in trait anxiety (albeit in a
relatively small sample size of n = 20; Fig. 4B). These ﬁndings rep-
licate previous work that had implicated the human hippocam-
pus in the processing of mixed-valence stimuli (O’Neil et al. 2015).
Although the hippocampal cluster that responded to mixed-
valence stimuli in O’Neil et al.’s study did not show any speciﬁc
involvement in avoidance or approach, we note that our experi-
ment has roughly 10× more trials than that of O’Neil and collea-
gues, which gave us more statistical power to detect a speciﬁc
involvement of the hippocampus in avoidance. Additionally,
O’Neil et al. also report another cluster in the hippocampus that
was recruited when subjects approached both conﬂict and non-
conﬂict stimuli. Given the recruitment of this cluster in both con-
ﬂict and nonconﬂict conditions (i.e., in response to mixed-valence
as well as single-valence stimuli), it is likely that this activation
reﬂects hippocampal involvement in other incidentally invoked
cognitive processes unrelated to the Ap/Av conﬂict (e.g., reward
anticipation; Murty et al. 2016). In support of a hippocampal role
for avoidance, we note that lesions to the ventral hippocampus in
rats produce impulsivity and deﬁcits in inhibitory control, even in
the absence of an aversive context (Bannerman et al. 2003;
Pentkowski et al. 2006; Abela et al. 2013). Similarly, human
patients with anterior hippocampal lesions show decreased pas-
sive avoidance and behavioral inhibition when performing a
human analog of the tests typically used to study anxiety in
rodents (Bach et al. 2014). As such, our data are consistent with
Table 1 Hippocampal value signals by condition and choice
Left Right
2 × 2 (condition × choice) ANOVA (df = 1,19)
ME condition F = 3.70, P = 0.070 F = 4.16, P = 0.056
ME choice F = 12.55, P = 0.002** F = 7.39, P = 0.014*
Condition × choice F = 3.25, P = 0.088 F = 5.10, P = 0.036*
Simple effects (df = 19)
Ap/Av, reject versus others t = 4.26, P < 0.001*** t = 3.69, P = 0.002**
Ap/Ap, bomb versus others t = 1.90, P = 0.072 P > 0.01
Reject versus bomb (Ap/Av vs. Ap/Ap) P > 0.01 P > 0.01
Accept/explore versus no bomb/explore (Ap/Av vs. Ap/Ap) t = 3.33, P = 0.004** t = 3.8, P = 0.001**
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the suggestion that the anterior (as opposed to the posterior)
hippocampus is particularly involved in the processing of affect-
ive states such as anxiety (Fanselow and Dong 2010).
The function of the hippocampus in exerting inhibitory con-
trol on motor plans may indeed explain why approach–avoid-
ance conﬂict, which invokes incompatible motor plans, is such a
key feature in the rodent anxiety tests that have so convincingly
implicated this structure (Gray and McNaughton 2000). An open
question for future work concerns the extent to which the hippo-
campus is implicated in behavioral inhibition that does not con-
ﬂict with any ongoing approach impulses. Straightforward
avoidant responses (e.g., withdrawing from pain) and paradigms
that involve explicit expectations of imminent aversive experi-
ences may instead tap into other aspects of fear responding that
recruit other structures in the brain. Additionally, future work
should aim to identify the fundamental computations per-
formed in the hippocampus to support avoidance in the context
of Ap/Av conﬂict and test the relationship of those to other cog-
nitive functions supported by the hippocampus.
Although the spatial resolution of our MRI data precludes
formal quantiﬁcation of the signals in different hippocampal
subﬁelds, the segregation of choice-related signals mirrored the
spatial segregation of the different subﬁelds in the anterior
hippocampus. In the analysis of choice-related signals, the
inferior anterior clusters that robustly distinguished between
rejecting in the Ap/Av and choosing “bomb” in the Ap/Ap con-
ditions (Fig. 4A, blue) overlapped with the CA1 subﬁeld. In con-
trast, the superior hippocampus, overlapping with the CA3
subﬁeld, failed to distinguish between these analogous choices
in the different conditions (Fig. 4A, red), despite the close prox-
imity of these voxels to the voxels in the inferior hippocampal
clusters. We caution that our mapping of inferior and superior
hippocampal signals onto the underlying hippocampal sub-
ﬁelds should be considered exploratory, given the limited spa-
tial resolution of our fMRI data. Nonetheless, we include these
results in order to highlight hippocampal subﬁeld interactions
as a potentially productive focus for future work. Existing work
on human hippocampal contributions to anxiety has tended to
focus on orthogonal differences between anterior and posterior
segments while our results point toward the existence of differ-
ent functional signals within the anterior hippocampus itself,
and suggest that threat avoidance speciﬁcally may implicate
the inferior sections of the anterior hippocampus, where CA1
neurons are typically located.
One possibility is that processing within the hippocampal
circuit may transform a neural signal that relates to monitoring
into a signal that relates to categorical choice. Although value
signals are ubiquitous in the brain, in the context of approach–
avoidance conﬂict, the CA3 subregion of the hippocampus may
access and potentiate this value signal, possibly via pattern
completion mechanisms (which are thought to be implemen-
ted via the recurrent circuitry of this part of the brain; see
Knierim and Neunuebel 2016 for recent review). These poten-
tiated value signals may allow for a categorical decision vari-
able to emerge in downstream CA1, a region of the brain that
has previously been implicated in the processing and detection
of novelty and associative mismatch (Hasselmo et al. 1996;
Kumaran and Maguire 2006, 2007). Such signal transformation
between CA3 and CA1 subﬁelds could be mediated by the
strength of activation in CA3 neurons, or could alternatively
rely on modulation by inputs from other neural regions, such
as the amygdala or prefrontal cortex. In fact, exploratory ana-
lysis revealed similarly potentiated value signals in the right
amygdala (Supplementary Fig. 6E), and others have also noted
similar signals in anterior cingulate (Amemori and Graybiel
2012). In rodents, both amygdala and prefrontal regions project
bidirectionally to the ventral hippocampus, the rodent homolog
of the human anterior hippocampus, and amygdala inputs to
the ventral hippocampus bidirectionally modulate anxiety-
related behavior (Felix-Ortiz et al. 2013). Such a circuit-level
mechanism for converting value signals in upstream regions
into categorical choice signals in downstream subregions could
plausibly underpin a hippocampal role in both monitoring and
active behavioral control.
Information seeking (exploration) did not elicit positive hip-
pocampal activation in our task in either the Ap/Av or Ap/Ap
conditions. Indeed, we did not ﬁnd any region in the brain that
distinguished between exploring in the Ap/Av versus Ap/Ap
conditions. The lack of an exploration-related condition ×
choice interaction in the hippocampus suggests that approach–
avoidance conﬂict per se does not inﬂuence the extent to which
information seeking positively engages the hippocampus.
Further, our results indicate that information seeking in an
approach–avoidance context is qualitatively similar to explor-
ation that occurs in a broader context. In both conditions, we
found that uncertainty-based exploration engaged a network of
regions that included the DLPFC, frontal pole and striatum,
regions widely associated with this function (Daw et al. 2006;
Badre et al. 2012) in a variety of probabilistic decision-making
studies. By contrast, the involvement of the hippocampus in
exploration has more frequently been seen in tasks that
emphasize the use or maintenance of acquired information
(e.g., Wang and Voss 2014).
Different types of exploration might engage hippocampal-
dependent processes to varying extents, and so elicit more or
less activity in this region. For example, cognitive processes
like memory, constructive imagination, or forward simulation
are known to involve the hippocampus in situations that do
not involve information seeking (Kumaran and Maguire 2007;
Hassabis and Maguire 2009; Redish 2016). Thus, types of explor-
ation that involve these processes might lead to hippocampal
activation (Simon and Daw 2011; Bornstein and Daw 2012 2013;
Wang and Voss 2014), whereas ones that arguably do not,
might not (Daw et al. 2006; Badre et al. 2012). One speculative
possibility is that, in our experiment, hippocampal deactivation
when subjects explored (Fig. 3A) may have reﬂected subjects
disengaging from representing the probabilistic outcomes asso-
ciated with the gambles in an episodic manner, with explor-
ation framed as a decision to defer difﬁcult choice in lieu of
active information gathering activities.
By combining careful experimental design, behavioral mod-
eling and fMRI, we have been able to parse hippocampal contri-
butions to avoidance and exploratory risk assessment when
human subjects faced an approach/avoidance conﬂict, while
controlling for spatial and mnemonic processes that may also
be invoked. Our results demonstrate that the hippocampus
supports behavioral avoidance as opposed to exploration in the
context of approach–avoidance conﬂict. Additionally, we iden-
tify different functional signals within the anterior hippocam-
pus that relate to threat monitoring and avoidance. While the
spatial resolution of our data precludes conﬁdent conclusions
about subﬁeld activations in our task, the data nevertheless
points toward the CA1 region in particular as a potentially pro-
ductive focus for future work.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary data are available at Cerebral Cortex online.
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